The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary liability: blueprint for a global regime? by Zingales, Nicolo
INTERNET POLICY REVIEW
Journal on internet regulation Volume 4 | Issue 4
Internet Policy Review | http://policyreview.info 1 December 2015 | Volume 4 | Issue 4
 
The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary
liability: blueprint for a global regime?
Nicolo Zingales
Tilburg Law School, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
Published on 28 Dec 2015 | DOI: 10.14763/2015.4.395
Abstract: While intermediary liability is becoming an issue of increasing importance in internet
governance discussions, little is being made at the institutional level to minimise conflicts across
jurisdictions and ensure the compliance of intermediary liability laws with fundamental rights
and the freedom to innovate. The experience leading to the adoption of the Brazilian “Marco
Civil  da Internet” offers concrete insights for the definition of a baseline framework at the
international level. This article also suggests the creation of a global forum of discussion on
intermediary liability, allowing the interests of a variety of stakeholders to be taken into account
in the definition and implementation of those baseline principles.
Keywords: Intermediary liability, Internet governance, Marco Civil da Internet
Article information
Received: 22 Nov 2015 Reviewed: 15 Dec 2015 Published: 28 Dec 2015
Licence: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Germany
Competing interests: The author has declared that no competing interests exist that have influenced
the text.
URL:
http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/brazilian-approach-internet-intermediary-liability-blueprint-g
lobal-regime
Citation: Zingales, N. (2015). The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary liability: blueprint for a
global regime?. Internet Policy Review, 4(4). DOI: 10.14763/2015.4.395
 
INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNET INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
Internet intermediaries are, in the most generic form, those entities providing services that
enable individuals to receive or impart information on the internet. Given their instrumental
role  for  individuals’  speech,  intermediaries  are  a  frequent  target  of  legal  actions  aimed at
preventing or stopping the publication of allegedly illegal material, even where such material
was not produced or edited in any way by the intermediary. Whether and to what extent these
entities have indeed a justiciable obligation to do so (and a consequent liability for failing to
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honour that obligation) depends on the applicable legal regime, which varies from country to
country. Yet, unlike other areas of global internet governance which are subject to a specific
forum of discussion,1 this field currently lacks an overarching framework for the development of
a common understanding on the role of intermediaries.
Internet intermediary liability is a wide-ranging topic, stretching into many different areas of
law, from defamation and privacy to trademark and copyright infringement - just to name a few.
Given the substantial differences between the issues at stake in these areas, legislators in many
countries adopted domain-specific  solutions,  with the aim to appropriately account for the
tension  between  different  rights  and  interests  at  stake.  However,  in  an  increasingly
interdependent digital environment, with an internet dominated by multinational corporations
providing  their  services  across  the  entire  world,  this  uncoordinated  heterogeneity  risks
generating  significant  problems  of  compliance  and  friction  across  different  regimes.  The
recognition by the European Union of a so called “right to be forgotten”, seen in contrast with
the reactions by US commentators (e.g., Zittrain, 2014 and 2014b; Bridy, 2014; Farrell, 2014;
Farrell and Newman, 2014; Ambrose, 2014) and the proposals for the adoption of a similar yet
significantly different right in Brazil,2 Japan, Korea, and most notably, Russia (where it was
signed into law in July 2015), offers one notable example of such friction. Differences of culture,
approaches and underlying values are exposed and accentuated, rather than mediated, in the
absence of a dedicated global governance forum defining guiding principles for the involvement
of internet intermediaries in the enforcement of the rights of their users. While a civil society
initiative was launched just  last  year  to  define guiding principles  for  intermediary liability
worldwide, a forum of discussion of these crucially important issues is conspicuously missing in
internet governance processes. This article suggests that the model chosen by Brazil  in the
adoption of its civil framework for the internet (Marco Civil da Internet) could be seen as an
inspiration for the definition of principles underlying such global mechanism. In particular, the
Brazilian model  distinguishes itself  on the basis  of:  (1)  the multistakeholder  nature of  the
process that led to the definition of the existing legal framework; and (2) the aspiration to give a
“constitutional” dimension to such framework, by recognising a number of fundamental rights
and principles as founding pillars of internet regulation.
Section 1 briefly illustrates the clashes of interests that underlie the discussions on intermediary
liability, including distinctions of the role of such parties under different scenarios. Section 2
describes the remarkable achievements of the Brazilian Marco Civil, signed into law in April
2014, and explains the tensions underlying some of its key provisions. Finally, Section 3 sets the
foundations for a “global Marco Civil” by identifying key baseline principles, and recommends
the creation of a global forum for the discussion of intermediary liability.
1. THE DILEMMA OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY: EXPOSING THE CLASHES OF INTERESTS
In essence, internet intermediary liability is concerned with one fundamental question: what are
reasonable  normative expectations of  involvement by intermediaries  in  the enforcement of
different laws and regulations? If on the one hand, the protection of rights in cyberspace may be
deprived  of  its  effectiveness  without  the  ability  to  rely  on  intermediaries  for  immediate
enforcement, on the other hand imposing on intermediaries the duty to monitor the activity of
their customers and/or prevent the publication of any potentially infringing content constitutes
a serious restraint on speech, which can only be permitted under stringent conditions according
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to international human rights law.3 Moreover, imposing a duty to monitor or police content
leads to the risk of having the intermediary holding back the emergence of new services with
even the slightest infringing potential, and generates a “culture of permission” which is ill-suited
for the development of innovative products and services in a knowledge-intensive economy.
To obviate these concerns, legal systems generally define some “comfort zones”, also known as
“safe  harbours”,  where  intermediaries  can  operate  without  being  held  responsible  for  the
conduct  of  their  users.  However,  the  scope  and depth  of  these  safe  harbours  vary  across
jurisdictions,  thereby  generating  conflicting  standards  which  are  in  tension  with  the
transnational nature of the internet. The elaboration of common standards faces two distinct
challenges: first, the conceptual challenge of defining the boundaries of the notion of “internet
intermediaries”; second, the practical challenge of designing a regime that is fair and effective in
securing the protection of individual rights, whilst encouraging responsible behaviour by the
intermediaries. Admittedly, answering these questions is not a binary exercise, and will depend
on the perspective one adopts. For this reason, understanding the needs and concerns of the
various  actors  involved,  in  relation  to  different  regimes,  is  crucial  to  the  identification  of
appropriate rules.
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: DISTINGUISHING ACTORS IN
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY REGIMES
A first striking divergence of interests exists between (1) content producers, whose business
model depends on the publication of “quality” content; and (2) infrastructure providers, who
merely provide a technical service, and for this reason aspire being treated as “dumb pipes”, not
expected to either detect or remove potentially illegal material. This distinction indeed informs
virtually  any intermediary liability  frameworks,  providing at  a  minimum two different safe
harbours  for  these  categories.  Less  visible  or  widely  acknowledged  are  the  tensions  and
differences  within  these  two  categories:  for  example,  big  content  producers  place  great
importance on proactive and automated enforcement by intermediaries; in contrast, small and
independent producers tend to promote greater ability to make transformative uses of content
(as this increases visibility of their work), and are therefore opposed to a system of automatic
takedown,  pointing  out  the  risks  of  collateral  censorship.  Similarly,  within  the  group  of
infrastructure providers one can distinguish mere conduits (who simply provide connectivity to
the internet) from those who provide more advanced or “special” services,4 which require the
application of traffic or content management techniques for the distinction between types of
transmitted or selected content. The latter entities have the technical ability to detect at least
some illegal material and take enforcement action against it, though it is debatable how far this
technical ability should translate into a duty of care towards the government (as it has occurred,
for example, in the case of prevention of malware or child-pornographic material). At the same
time, it  should be noted that the ability of selecting or discriminating content places these
intermediaries outside the “mere conduit”  safe harbour,  which requires the conduit  not  to
initiate the transmission and not to select the receiver, nor select or modify content. Although
some of these activities (for example, search) can be protected under different safe harbours
(such as those for hosting and caching), other advanced services may fall outside the protection
defined by the existing intermediary liability regimes.
Another  important  point  to  be  made  with  regard  to  infrastructure  providers  is  that  their
interests on the scope of intermediary liability legislation are usually in direct tension with those
of copyright owners, making it difficult to reach compromises other than of bilateral nature.
This difficulty can be ascertained, for example, in the failure of the long process of negotiation
which  followed the  approval  of  the  Digital  Economy Act  (in  2010)  in  the  UK,  where  the
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communication regulator (Ofcom) was entrusted with the task to implement general principles
by brokering a multistakeholder consensus on the splitting of costs for the filtering imposed to
internet service providers (ISPs) in order to prevent copyright infringement. After negotiations
under Ofcom’s auspices protracted for over three years without bearing fruit, an agreement on
voluntary copyright alert measures was achieved between ISPs and copyright owners, thereby
bypassing the multistakeholder character of the consensus that the procedure was supposed to
follow. While the failure of the institutional mechanism was arguably due to the complexity of
reaching multistakeholder consensus in an area of such intense conflict, it also provided clear
evidence that the relative weight of copyright in the discussions of intermediary liability should
not be underestimated.
2. A CASE STUDY IN THE GOVERNANCE OF ONLINE
INTERMEDIARIES: THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH
A. THE BIRTH OF THE MARCO CIVIL DA INTERNET
The situation in Brazil regarding intermediary liability was until 2014 one of complete absence
of specific rules; and this led courts to treat it on the basis of general principles of civil and
consumer protection law, which imposed a very high standard of care5 sometimes comparable to
strict liability. It also led to a series of private agreements between copyright holders, ISPs and
other internet services and to the affirmation of a set of informal norms around notice and
takedown that proved “very compliant with industry demands” (Nicoletti Mizukami et al., 2011,
p. 263).
Despite the effectiveness of this system for prompt removal of copyright infringing material,
copyright owners were still uneasy about the possibility for users to play “whack-a-mole” with
copyrighted content, uploading it swiftly and with impunity shortly after removal. In their view,
absence of a procedure for obliging ISPs to hand over or even retain subscriber data manifested
itself as a key challenge to the effectiveness of copyright protection vis-à-vis repeated infringers.
For this reason, a bill (the “Azeredo Bill”) was introduced in 2008 proposing a 3-year mandatory
period of data retention, and requiring ISPs to collaborate in the disclosure of the identity of
infringers.  The Azeredo Bill  also  criminalised access  to  data  “without  authorization of  the
legitimate owner”, by imposing a sanction of two to four years of jail, thereby turning into a
felony overnight (Saldias, 2015, p. 3) the conduct of approximately 60% of Brazilians. Inspired
by the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, the bill was an attempt to enact a criminal
statute without even having in place a civil framework for the internet - which was the case for
the great majority of the other states parties to the convention.
This is the background from which the Marco Civil da Internet (Federal Law No. 12965/2014,
previously Bill  No. 2126/2011), gradually came into being: civil  society, firmly rejecting the
measures put forward in the Azeredo Bill, launched a campaign of fierce opposition (which
became known as “Mega Não”)  and generated consensus over the need to develop a civil
framework  in  respect  of  the  civil  rights  and  liberties  of  Brazilian  citizens.  This  led  to  a
partnership between the federal government and the Center for Technology and Society of the
Law School at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CTS/FGV), resulting in a joint proposal and relying
on an innovative platform for online public consultation which allowed everyone to comment
and to contribute to the drafting of the bill.
Between 2009 and 2010 the  public  consultation  gathered  approximately  2,000 comments
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(respectively 800 and 1,180 in each of its two phases); contributions were also collected via
other channels, including receiving direct submissions and scanning social media for dedicated
commentary (Nicoletti Mizukami, 2015). In 2011, the bill was signed by the executive and sent
to Parliament, where Alessandro Molon was appointed as its rapporteur. Having organised a
series of events and a further consultation for the proposed text, Molon cleared the bill for
voting on July 2012; however, the approval was repeatedly delayed (until March 2014) due to
strong pressures on particular provisions, including: (1) on intermediary liability, with the clash
between telecommunications companies and Rede Globo, a powerful media group representing
a significant player in the copyright industry in Brazil; (2) on data retention, with the clash
between  civil  society,  the  federal  police  and  other  sectors  engaged  in  the  fight  against
cybercrime; and finally (3) on network neutrality, with the clash between telecommunication
companies and content providers.
The Marco Civil is also known as “constitution for the internet” because it revolves the whole
regulatory framework around a number of guarantees for civil liberties, such as the privacy and
freedom of expression of users. Freedom of expression is explicitly erected as the main pillar for
the discipline of internet use in Brazil, along with others listed in article 2.6 Furthermore, article
3 explicitly recognises, among other things, the guarantees of freedom of expression, privacy
and liability  of  the agents according to their  activities  (i.e.,  not  for  the conduct  of  others)
pursuant to the law; and the freedom of business models on the internet is subordinated to the
aforementioned principles. Finally, article 8 establishes that any contractual clause in breach of
the rights to privacy and freedom of speech (including in particular the inviolability and secrecy
of communication)7 will be considered null and void.
While  the  battle  over  net  neutrality  was  settled  with  the  need  to  define  the  appropriate
regulation at a later (upcoming) stage, the fight over data retention resulted in a steep decrease
of the mandatory period of three years proposed in Azeredo Bill, imposing one year for the
storing of connection data and six months for the records of access to internet applications (so
called “logs”). In comparison, the solution found to the controversy over intermediary liability
strikes as being much more complex and articulated.
B. INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY PROVISIONS IN THE MARCO CIVIL
The intermediary liability package of the Marco Civil consists of four main rules. The first is laid
out in article 18, which establishes that the provider of connection to the internet shall not be
liable for civil damages resulting from content generated by third parties: this is a strong version
of the “mere conduit” principle, without any circumstantiations (found in other jurisdictions)
concerning the initiation or modification of the transmission, or the technological means used to
accomplish transmission. Secondly, article 19 limits the possible liability for internet application
providers (broadly analogous to “content hosts”)8  to cases where they fail to remove illegal
content upon specific judicial order. It also enables judges to issue injunctions anticipating the
effects of the request, upon fulfillment of the requisites of likelihood of success and irreparable
damage (or damage that is difficult to repair). Third, article 21 establishes a special provision for
breach of privacy arising from the disclosure of images, videos and other materials containing
nudity or sexual activities of private nature, without the authorisation of participants: this is
known as the “revenge porn” exception, which imposes liability to internet application providers
for lack of “due diligence” whenever they fail  to promptly remove content after receiving a
specific request in this sense,9 either by the interested party or by his/her legal representative.
Finally, article 31 makes a specific exemption for the liability of internet application providers in
case of copyright or related rights: the applicable procedure in force will remain that of the
existing copyright law, at least up and until the entering into force of the copyright regulation
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which is currently under discussion at the Parliament (since 2010).  Given intense industry
pressure, this was considered too sensitive of an issue to be dealt with under the same golden
standards applicable to other categories of intermediary liability; in fact, this exception was
reportedly  crafted  to  prevent  the  blocking  of  the  bill  by  the  cultural  production  industry,
spearheaded by Globo.
In particular, the introduction of the exception was considered by civil society a better option
than the abandonment of the requirement of prior judicial order, which had emerged strongly
from the multistakeholder process of the consultation. Unwilling to give up the “notice and
takedown” procedure already utilised by a  variety  of  intermediaries,  representatives  of  the
copyright industry interceded with Rapporteur Molon before the clearing of the bill for voting,
in an attempt to generalise the application of the notice and takedown regime. Following an
amendment of the proposed bill in this sense and the subsequent pushback by civil society, the
final  bill  re-incorporated  the  judicial  order  requirement  and  included  the  aforementioned
exception for copyright (Nicoletti Mizukami, 2015). This late addition was coupled with the
revenge  porn  exception,  which  resulted  from  the  demands  of  government  and  public
prosecutors prevailing over the opposing forces in civil society (Lemos et al., 2015). All in all, it
is  apparent  that  the  Marco  Civil  was  the  result  of  a  compromise  between  different
constituencies. Nevertheless, the opening to multistakeholder participation at various stages of
drafting  and  consultation  of  the  bill  did  not  prevent  it  from achieving  quite  far-reaching
positions of entitlement for individual rights, particularly on privacy and freedom of expression.
In this context, the enunciation of two important principles of intermediary liability (that such
liability is excluded for conduits, regardless of the means of operation; and that the same applies
to content hosts, as long as they have not received a judicial order to remove content) is a
remarkable achievement which reinforces the guarantees enshrined in this document. Both this
substantive  achievement  and  the  participatory  process  giving  rise  to  it  provide  important
lessons for legislators around the globe.
C. MULTISTAKEHOLDER PROCESSES AND DIFFERENTIATED REGIMES
One of the added values of the participatory process followed in the drafting of the Marco Civil
was to bring to the fore the interests of a variety of constituencies, in the attempt to achieve a
balanced  outcome.  However,  while  the  immediate  outcome  of  such  process  satisfied  the
majority  of  participants,  it  became  clear  that  the  produced  draft  left  a  number  of  key
stakeholders at discontent. This dissatisfaction prompted pressures to re-calibrate the rules in
line  with  the  peculiarity  of  those  interests  that  were  insufficiently  considered.  Despite  the
criticism towards these late amendments of the draft, it is arguable that these pressures were
not a bug, but an unavoidable feature of the multistakeholder process: democracy is also based
on the idea of contestation (Dahl, 1971), implying the ability for affected stakeholders to voice
their concerns in an attempt to influence the shaping of norms.
From a substantive perspective, the added value of this process was the identification of key
neglected  elements  in  the  design  of  the  rules  for  intermediary  liability.  Uncalibrated
intermediary liability regimes can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the operation
of other such regimes: the failure to account for the divergence of actors and interests can
generate negative externalities not only between the regimes established in specific cognate
areas, but also across the laws and policies pursued in different countries. Thus, in addition to
minimising  friction across  regimes,  well  calibrated  principles  of  intermediary  liability  may
contribute to preventing the proliferation of private agreements for area-specific enforcement
efforts,  which  arise  precisely  in  response  to  the  unsatisfactory  treatment  of  some  of  the
particular interests at stake. For example, what past experience has shown is that, in the absence
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of  a  copyright-specific  regulatory  solution,  representatives  of  the  intellectual  property
constituency tend to prevail over other stakeholders and skew the balance of the whole process
– conceivably as a result of greater subject-matter expertise, rhetoric and coordination - at the
expense of a more dispersed and less resourceful representation of users and civil society.
This came out clearly in the latest attempt to establish global provisions on intermediary liability
within a charter of “Principles” of internet governance: the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on
Internet Governance (NETmundial). While the original text which resulted from a call for online
contributions had no specific provision on intermediary liability, the new text which was drafted
on the basis of the inputs received at the NETmundial meeting included the principle that
“Intermediary liability limitations should be implemented in a way that respects and promotes
economic growth, innovation, creativity and free flow of information. In this regard, cooperation
among all stakeholders should be encouraged to address and deter illegal activity, consistent
with fair process.” As noted elsewhere, this formulation is problematic to the eye of civil society
because the focus on economic aspects prevails over the protection of human rights - precisely
the opposite of what Marco Civil suggests. Those who were present at the meeting witnessed
that this compromise was the result of intense lobbying from the copyright industry; in other
words, the sole existing model for intermediary liability in global internet governance processes
appears  to  be  designed  to  accommodate  the  needs  of  copyright  (and  perhaps  trademark)
owners.
3. THE PILLARS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANT
MODEL FOR INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
As noted, the Marco Civil is known as a “constitution for the internet” in light of its focus on
fundamental rights: heralding those rights as pillars for the discipline of internet use in Brazil,
the Marco Civil subordinates the freedom to conduct business and the legitimacy of contractual
arrangements  to  the  respect  of  those  fundamental  values.  While  the  prioritisation  of
fundamental rights is  not enshrined in a document with force superior to that of ordinary
legislation, as it is usually the case for national constitutions, the fact that the amendment of the
Marco  Civil  does  not  require  a  reinforced  procedure  is  of  secondary  importance  for  our
purposes: the symbolic value of this law is enormous, as it illuminates the road ahead for the
development  of  a  “global  constitution”  for  intermediary  liability.  The  form  that  such
international document may take is, in this context, less relevant than the model that it offers,
and the potential that this has in breaking the global deadlock (and reducing the friction) of
contrasting  positions  advanced  by  different  countries  in  the  regulation  of  internet
intermediaries.
In order to achieve a balanced framework for the regulation of intermediary liability, it is wise to
proceed on the basis of a number of pillars, which, much like in the Marco Civil, can serve as
guidepost for the drafting of more specific provisions, including those concerning the conduct
expected from intermediaries. Modeling an appropriate regime requires an acceptance of the
essential rule of law requirements which are at the basis of our understanding of the internet as
an enabler of economic and social development. To that end, the following list proposes five
principles which most clearly enshrine these ideals, and which can thus be fruitfully erected as
pillars for future discussions on global intermediary liability.
(1) Freedom of expression. At its core, the development of human beings and societies in an
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interconnected information economy is  founded on the engine of  the internet as a way to
connect people and let information flow between them, which is conceptually anchored on the
idea of a global, unrestricted ability to impart and receive information. Accordingly, appropriate
principles should be developed to frame the extent to which intermediaries may legitimately
interfere with this fundamental right.
(2) Access. Without equal and effective access to the internet, the ability of “netizens” to receive
and impart ideas is undermined at its root, thereby compromising the series of benefits that
such “flow of  information” can bring about.  In this  sense,  access  is  a  prerequisite  for  the
enjoyment of individual rights and freedoms on the internet. A full embracement of this concept
would require the creation of a level playing field (for instance, through some form of “net
neutrality”  regulation)  where  all  individuals  have  the  same  opportunity  to  engage  in
communication without discrimination, and the compliance with minimum standards of quality
of service to ensure that such opportunity is not impaired in practical terms.
(3) Privacy and data protection. This is a concept that is intrinsically connected to the idea of
free expression, in at least two different ways: first, the respect for a sphere of intimacy of
individuals serves as a limitation on the scope of the right to freely express oneself. Second, the
possibility to exercise some form of control over the information of oneself,  which is made
available to the public, enabling oneself to communicate more freely in the first place. As a
result, intermediary liability regimes should duly acknowledge and account for the interaction
between these interests and freedom of expression.
(4) Due process. This is a notion that is also used in a variety of contexts,  and which can
therefore give rise to confusion. It represents the foundation of a democratic society on the rule
of law, as opposed to rule by law (Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008), which in the words of the legal
scholar who is considered to have founded this concept, is grounded on the notions of equality
before the law, absolute supremacy of the law over arbitrary power; and interpretation and
enforcement of the law by the courts (Dicey, 1959). Putting this in more concrete terms, due
process refers to those procedural rights which a state “owes” to members of the legal system
that are subject to specific individual determinations, specifically imposing the existence of the
following minimum requirements to enable any potentially affected party to present its case: (a)
a form of legal process which respects the guarantees of independence and impartiality; (b) the
right to be informed about the law and to receive notice of the allegations against oneself, and
respond to them to the extent that not doing so may prejudice the outcome of the dispute; and
(c)  the right  to  a  reasoned decision,  addressing every essential  claim in the matter  under
dispute. The fulfilment of these requirements should be demanded to intermediaries in any
dispute resolution system they set up, and should be ensured through any further remedies
offered to individuals against adverse decisions taken by intermediaries which concern them.
(5) Free and open internet. This is a principle from which emanate important consequences for
the free flow of information and ideas - although not necessarily of the same rank as that of the
fundamental rights and freedoms mentioned above. Perhaps the best way to define internet
freedom is  to  focus  on  the  concepts  of  “openness”  and  “permissionless  innovation”  (Van
Schewick, 2012), both alluding to a collaborative environment where users are to a meaningful
extent free to develop new ideas, without being “held up” by proprietary technologies or other
rigid legal or technical mechanisms of protection. The implication for intermediary liability is
that any designated governance mechanism should strive to preserve these characteristics, so as
not to undermine the “generative” nature of the internet (Zittrain, 2006).
In accordance with the above principles, a very useful departure point in the search for a global
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regime for intermediary liability is the dedicated section of the 2011 Joint Declaration of the four
Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of
American  States’  Interamerican  Commission  on  Human  Rights  (IACHR)  the  African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  The declaration restates  the traditional  "conduit  principle"
(applicable in virtually every regime of  intermediary liability)  and suggests considering the
possibility of limiting the liability of other intermediaries under the same conditions: in other
words, treating intermediaries uniformly by exempting them from liability to the extent that
they do not initiate the transmission or select its receiver, or modify the information contained
in the transmission. This enables automatic services provided upon request to develop without
the threat of potential litigation, simultaneously enabling speech and maintaining the incentives
for the creation of innovative business models.
The other side of the coin, however, is that immunity may also generate perverse incentives on
some of the rights at stake, such as privacy, due process, and even the very same freedom of
speech that the qualified immunity is meant to serve. As a result, while this principle is useful to
define  a  minimum  standard,  it  is  insufficient  to  identify  a  framework  for  responsible
engagement by online intermediaries. On this aspect, the Rapporteurs’ message holds back in
order to leave space for creative solutions in the definition of the applicable regime. At the same
time, however, it calls against the imposition of duties to monitor the [legality of] the activity
taking  place  within  the  intermediaries’  services;  and  against  the  adoption  of  extrajudicial
content takedown rules which (as is the case under several regimes) fail to provide sufficient
protection for freedom of expression.
Furthermore, while the Rapporteurs encourage the adoption of self-regulatory solutions for the
management  of  rights  online,  this  should  be  read  in  conjunction  with  the  importance  of
minimum safeguards for individual liberties. Such safeguards would imply, for example, the
need for stringent conditions for disclosure of the identity of suspected infringers – an aspect on
which  national  laws  differ,  and  which  is  traditionally  left  unaddressed  by  the  agreements
stipulated between ISPs and the copyright industry.  The creation of a dedicated forum for
substantive discussion on these topics, ideally of multistakeholder nature, would provide the
opportunity to define minimum safeguards for the protection of  the fundamental  rights of
individuals, and for preserving the incentives for responsible innovation. The values of privacy,
freedom of expression, due process, access and free and open internet should be institutionally
embedded into intermediary liability regimes of any form and dimension.
CONCLUSION
The Brazilian experience provides at least three lessons for the development of intermediary
liability regimes: first,  it  identified the “constitutional ground” upon which an intermediary
liability  regime should  be  founded,  circumscribed  by  a  number  of  principles  safeguarding
fundamental rights while encouraging private enterprises. Second, it offered a practical example
of the feasibility of achieving consensus over basic intermediary liability principles not only
among  a  variety  of  stakeholders,  but  strikingly,  through  a  participatory  multistakeholder
drafting procedure. At the same time, the multistakeholder process exposed the need for a
differentiated intermediary liability regime, in particular for copyright and “revenge porn”, by
defining specific exceptions to those principles. Besides illustrating the unsuitability of a “one
size fits all” approach, this raises important questions concerning the appropriate scope for
differential treatment in intermediary liability legislations, an aspect which should be at the core
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of future intermediary liability discussions. Now that the Marco Civil  has shed light on the
promises and challenges of this path, it is up to participants in internet governance processes to
seize  the  opportunity  and  elevate  the  intermediary  liability  discussion  from  localised
parochialism to the global stage it deserves.
DISCLAIMER
The  author  is  a  co-founder  and  co-chair  of  the  Internet  Governance  Forum’s  Dynamic
Coalition  on  Platform  Responsibility  (DCPR),  a  multistakeholder  group  focused  on  the
definition of  standards  of  “responsible  conduct”  for  online  platforms.  The DCPR recently
produced a set of Recommendations on Terms of Service and Human Rights, the main ideas of
which are under consultation at the following link.
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FOOTNOTES
1. These are, for instance: the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) - on
interconnection; the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) - a forum on ICT and
development; the Global Conference on Cyberspace (GCC) - on cyber security; the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) meetings - on domain names and
numbers; and a wide range of events at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) -
on intellectual property, and the Human Rights Council (HRC) - on human rights.
2. See Bill N. 7781/2014, of Mr. Renato Cunha; retrieved from
http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=1270760&filename
=PL+7881/2014; and explained in English at “Brazilian Congressman Introduces Right to Be
Forgotten Bill”, Information Security Blog (23 October 2014); retrieved from
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/10/articles/brazilian-
congressman-introduces-right-forgotten-bill/. See also Bill n. 215/2015, retrieved from
http://www2.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra;jsessionid=9242F3D0D215
3233D3474BAA94BA53FA.proposicoesWeb1?codteor=1395933&filename=Parecer-CCJC-06-
10-2015; and explained in English in “Draft Bill 215/2015, infanticide to the newly-born digital
rights in Brazil”, Digital Rights Newsletter N. 27 (27 October 2015), Retrieved from
http://www.digitalrightslac.net/en/proyecto-de-ley-2152015-infanticidio-contra-los-recien-naci
dos-derechos-digitales-en-brasil/ .
3. For example, according to international human rights instruments such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and regional human rights conventions, a
number of restrictions must be necessary for the attainment of an objective that has been clearly
recognised and disciplined by law. See e.g. article 12, 14, 19, 21 and 23 of the ICCPR.
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4. “Special” is used here to refer to the offering of features other than basic connectivity to the
open internet, e.g. selection or aggregation of content, optimised connection to particular
content, application or services (including zero-rating), or connection with enhanced security or
privacy. Note that this definition differs from the notion of “specialised” services, which are
exempted from the network neutrality obligations that are being defined both in the European
Union (European Commission, 2015) and the United States (United States Federal
Communication Commission, 2015), both of which require such services to be provided in
addition to regular internet access.
5. See among others, Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice, Fourth Panel, Google Brazil, Special
Appeal no. 1306157/SP, 24 March 2014.
6. Namely: (i) the recognition of the global scale of the network; (ii) human rights, personality
development and the exercise of citizenship in digital media; (iii) plurality and diversity; (iv)
openness and cooperation; (v) free enterprising, free competition and consumer protection; and
(vi) the social purpose of the network.
7. In that regard, article 10 provides that the content of communications may only be made
available by court order, and any operation of collection, storage, retention and treating of
personal data or communication data taking place (at any point in the chain of these acts) in
Brazil must comply with Brazilian law.
8. “Applications” are defined by article 5 as “the set of functionalities that can be accessed
through a terminal connected to the internet”.
9. This means that, for this particular kind of content, a request for removal by a designated
party triggers the liability of the intermediary for the continued existence of that material on the
intermediary’s property or services. However, the provision stipulates that this regime only
applies subject to “technical limitations of the service”, which may justify a delayed response to
the aforementioned request.
